Archive for the ‘Discourse and Pragmatics’ Category
Schemata & Schemata Theory
Wednesday, September 13th, 2006Our world knowledge and social knowledge is crucial for the production and understanding of discourse.
For effective communication to occur, it is necessary that
- the receiver have enough prior knowledge
- the sender correctly judge the extent of that knowledge
How our pre-existing knowledge of the world shapes the production and understanding of discourse attracted attention mostly due to the advent of Artificial Intelligence – AI.
The most important idea that came into discourse analysis from the field of AI is knowledge schemata.
Schemata are ‘data structure(s) - or networks of stereotypical information about particular topics/themes
The main idea in schemata theory is that the mind, when stimulated by key words/phrases in a particular discourse or by the context, activates existing knowledge schemata and makes sense of the new information by relating it to information already stored.
According to some schemata theorists in the comprehension of (both oral and written) discourse:
- first, a surface representation is attained by breaking down the discourse in to components and stored in the short-term memory and
- next, a mental representation of it is formed in the episodic memory
- finally, a conceptual model is formed and integrated into the long-term memory as scripts or schemata
These three levels of comprehension do not operate independently. Production and comprehension of discourse is helped when linguistic observations activate relevant schemata by focusing on existing knowledge structures (linguistic and world knowledge) larger units of meaning are constructed.
A story for you:
Mahir is often late to school. Today a supervisor asked him why he was late to school so often and he said he didn’t know. According to Mahir, every morning he comes straight to school and yet he is late. So the supervisor asked him to tell her everything he did since he got up until he left for school. And this is what he said:
I got up at 6:30. Got ready. Mum made me a sandwich and a glass of juice. I watched a few minutes of Hendhunu Hendhuna. Then I left for school at about 6:50.
Is this adequate information for the supervisor?
Or would it more appropriate if Mahir had said:
I woke up at about 6:20. I opened my eyes a bit, closed them again and lay in bed for about 10 more minutes. Then I threw back the quilt and sat up cross-legged on the bed. After a few seconds I got out of bed and walked towards the towel rack. I took my towel and walked to the toilet. Then I opened the door and walked in. I took my toothbrush and put some toothpaste on it. Then I brushed my teeth for about a minute or so and rinsed my mouth. Then IÂ … … … After that I put on my uniform … … … and left for school.
When Mahir says he left for school, does he have to tell us that he put on his uniform? Why?
When Mahir tells us that he got up and got ready we assume that he must have got out of bed, cleaned up and changed into school clothes.
This is because we have knowledge of a typical ‘getting ready for school; and can therefore fill in the missing details.
This pre-existing knowledge can be called a ‘getting ready schemata’
When a sender knows that a receiver’s schema to be similar to his own to a significant degree, then he needs to mention only features that are not contained in it (e.g. when he got up, what he had for breakfast etc) and other features (e.g. getting out of bed, putting on the school uniform) will be assumed unless otherwise told.
PROOF OF SCHEMATA
There is much evidence that the mind does use knowledge schemata in interpreting discourse.
One piece of evidence is the fact that when questioned about a particular discourse or asked to recall it, very often we fill in details which were not actually given.
Another piece of evidence is the use of the definite article in certain cases.
e.g.
As I was already running late I called a taxi. But the taxi driver took so long to find our place that I was late for work anyway.
What is the traditional use of the definite article ‘the’?
So why do we use ‘the taxi driver’ here?
Even though he is mentioned for the first time, it is appropriate to use the taxi driver here because our schemata for ‘taxi’ contains a taxi driver and therefore when someone talks about a taxi coming, we assume that it will have a driver.
However:
As I was already running late I called a taxi. But the TV star took so long to find our place that I was late for work anyway.
If the taxi driver was a TV star, we are unlikely to assume that the listener would know this unless we tell them.
More proof of schemata:
Look at the following and suggest a continuation for each
1. She’s one of those dumb, pretty Marilyn Monroe type blondes. She spends hours looking after her nails. She polishes them every day and keeps them …
2. The king put his seal on the letter. It …
Now look at these continuations:
1. …all neatly arranged in little jam jars in the cellar, graded according to length, on the shelf above the hammers and the electric drills.
2. …waggled its flippers, caught a fish in its mouth.
(Note: these examples are from Cook (1995). They are so interesting and illustrative I had to borrow them!)
Obviously we interpret meanings of words with more than one meaning based on our schemata about the context in which it is used.
This is a method used in jokes, riddles and literature – they activate your existing schemata for a particular topic/context and then overturn it.
Schemata are not simple isolated units stored in the mind that and neither can discourse be interpreted with reference to one schemata.
It is far more complicated than that. In making sense of a piece of discourse, the mind activates a number of schemata simultaneously.
In storing new information any of the following may happen:
- existing schemata are adapted to incorporate new information
- completely new schemata are formed
- old schemata are discarded
Felicity Conditions & Conversational Implicature
Tuesday, September 5th, 2006Think about the following situation:
You see a man snatch a lady’s bag and run. You chase the man and when you catch him you hold his hands behind his back and say, ‘You are under arrest’.
Would the man consider himself under arrest? Why?
Another example:
If I were to say:
’s of now, I declare the Maldives a kingdom!’
or
‘I will reduce enrollment fees for BA TEFL next year’
or
‘ou must submit the next assignment tomorrow’
Now think about this:
Fareeda often borrows books from people but never return them. When people ask her to bring back their books, she promises to do so soon but never does. After a few weeks she (conveniently) forgets that she did borrow a book from that person. Not knowing this, Ashfa lent her a book a week ago. Since then you have been asking her for the book almost every day (with little success!).
Ashfa: Fareeda, I need the book you borrowed. When will you return it?
Fareeda: book? which one?
Ashfa: Oh come on! The one on pragmatics that you borrowed form me last week. Don’t tell me you’ve misplaced it!
Fareeda: Oh that one! … no no I have not misplaced it. I have it at home. I will bring it to class tomorrow.
Another situation:
You are standing by the entrance to Ameenee Building, waiting for a friend. Someone comes and parks a huge truck in front of the building, blocking the entrance completely. The driver gets out and walks away. When the security guard comes out you are the only one standing near the truck. The Guard says to you, ‘Please move the truck’.
Obviously there are conditions for speech act to be effective.
Only certain people (often in certain circumstances) under particular conditions can say something and expect it to have an effect.
These conditions that need to be met in order for a speech act to be effective are known as felicity conditions.
e.g.
felicity conditions for an order are:
1. the sender believes the action should be done.
2. the receiver has the ability to do the action
3. the receiver has the obligation to do the action
4. the sender has the right to tell the receiver to do the action
Loosely speaking, felicity conditions can be divided into 3 types:
i. preparatory conditions
ii. conditions for execution
iii. sincerity conditions
Preparatory conditions
Preparatory conditions include factors such as the status or authority of the speaker to perform the speech act, the situation of other parties.
The situation of the utterance is important.
e.g.
In a soccer match, only the officiating referee can offer a penalty; one of the assistant referees (who are also qualified referees) cannot do so.
Conditions for execution
Conditions for execution are often exaggerated. Ritual or ceremonial actions accompanying certain speech act are so ingrained in our minds that we sometimes believe the act is invalidated, if the action is lacking - but there are few real examples of this.
Sincerity Conditions
Simple speaking these show that the speaker actually intends what s/he says. Like in the case for apologizing or promising, it is often impossible for others to determine whether or not sincerity conditions are fulfilled.
However there are some speech acts (e.g. finalizing a contract/deal) where this sincerity is determined by the presence of witnesses; so that one (or more) of the parties cannot later claim that they didn’t really mean it.
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE
In his series of lectures at Harvard University in 1967, Grice also outline an approach to what he termed ‘conversations implicature’.
Grice defines conversational implicature as the way in which hearers understand the complete message even when a speaker means more than exactly what they say.
e.g
‘Do you have some areca nut?’
What does the speaker want the hearer to understand from this?
The conversational implicature is a message that is not explicitly stated within the utterance. The speaker implies it. Grice proposed that the hearer is able to infer the intended message because they understand three things:
i. The usual linguistic meaning of what is said.
ii. Contextual information (shared or general knowledge).
iii. The assumption that the speaker is obeying the cooperative principle.





